

STANTON AND MCLELLAN
NEW LIGHT ON THE CAUSES OF MCLELLAN'S REMOVAL.

The following letter, written by Edwin Stanton to his personal friend and confidant the Rev. Herman Dyer, has just been printed in Indianapolis. It is a very important contribution to the literature of the controversy growing out of the removal of Gen. McClellan from the command of the Army of the Potomac:

[illegible]

planned to attack from the rear under the most favorable conditions. The army would not move without leaving sufficient force in and around Washington to make the capital perfectly secure against all danger, and the government would be able to rely upon the judgment of all the commanders of army corps. In order to enable Gen. McCallien to devote his entire attention to the defense of the city, it was decided to place the command of the army which was quite enough to tax the ability of the ablest commander in the world, he relieved of the charge of the other military operations, to be placed in the hands of the experienced commanders who were able to direct operations in their own departments.

When a part of his force had been transferred to Fortress Monroe and the whole of the army was concentrated at Washington, I was given to me by various persons that there was good reason to fear that no adequate force could be obtained to defend the city in case of sudden attack; that the enemy might decide

large force and seize it at a time when it would be impossible to render any assistance. So the alarm was expressed by many persons and the President was informed of the same. He neglected to order a report of the force to be sent to defend Washington. It was reported by the commander to be less than 20,000 raw recruits, with not a single battle-tested soldier. A day like this one made before at Westchester would at any time take the capital of the nation. The report of the force left to defend Washington and the order of the President were both wrong. The General Hitchcock to report—first, whether the President's orders had been complied with; second, whether the force left to defend the city was sufficient. His report in the morning was correct. The report of the force was submitted to the President, who also consulted Gen. Totten, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Meigs, and

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Thomas agreed, but the President was anxious that Gen. McClellan should have cause of complaint that he ordered the force to be sent by water, although that route was then travelled by the Merrimac. I yielded opinion to the President's order, but between him and me there has never been the slightest shadow since I entered the Cabinet. And,

Now one word as to political moves. When I wrote my letter to Mr. McCallan, I was not even thinking of being a candidate for anyone. I hold my present position at the request of those whom I had not yet known from the 4th of March, 1891, until the day he came to see me. Everything I cherished and held dear would have been sacrificed by accepting office, but I thought it better to do so than to be willing to perish. I wanted to be a politician or a candidate for any of the offices of the country, and I knew robbers who are howling around me? never taken for a moment and could be

What I do for anything else then motives to overcome time and look forward to clarity of vision. I have no doubt that I will be in government, and for my acts in the effort to maintain it I expect to be severely criticized. I will pardon this long explanation which has been made to you. It is due to the fact that I have been unable to make any claim on your confidence or kindness. I cannot be made public for obvious reasons. I am not a member of the army. I must have every confidence of support, and I will not give it to anyone who would rebel against me, rather than diminish one grain of the strength of my government. I will not give up like this justice or credit to individuals, but stand in the balance. Desiring peace and quiet of my home, I suffer no inconvenience beyond the anxiety suffered by myself, who are naturally disturbed by the feeling of hostility to me. The officers will at the proper time fully prove my Government's unsparing to support G. McCalla, and the people will be protected or otherwise; second, that have not been forced or threatened them in any particular way. I have no doubt that the protection was not needed and could not have been employed by him; that it was retained by

investigation, and upon the best military advice to the country; that its retention was to save the capital from the danger it had never been to disregard of the President's positive order on the 6th of March; fourth, that between the President and the military there never been the slightest shadow of difference upon any point save the attachment of Franklin's force, and that at that point of no significance, but in which the President was sustained by the majority of Thomas, and Ripley, while the President yielded only to an anxious desire to avoid complications, and to the fact that the military force was not needed by Gen. McClellan.

You will, of course, regard this explanation as but a mere excuse, and I am not prepared to offer information of yourself upon matters where you ask about. I shall always rejoice to be from you, and am, as ever, truly yours,

EDWARD M. STANTON

An Economist.

Hopkins—Why do you wear rubbers, Hopkins—**Hopkins**—My dear boy, there are no